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Interpretivism and the Meaning of Mental State
Ascriptions
Marc Slors
Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies, Radboud University
Interpretivism is oen seen as the theory according towhichmental state ascription
is useful, even though mental states do no really exist. is “as if ” theory is widely
held to be untenable. In this paper I argue that in order to avoid an “as if ” reading
of interpretivism, we should embrace the strongest version of this theory.
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1. Introduction
To lay my cards on the table straightaway: I was already a convert of in-
terpretivism. e nature of a person’s mental states depends, as far as I am
concerned, on the interpretability of her behaviour. us, reading Bruno
Mölder’s wonderfully thorough and detailed elaboration and defense of that
position did not change my mind—I found myself in agreement with the
general thrust of Mind Ascribed1 and with very many of its details. e
book is an important contribution to the literature on philosophy of mind,
precisely because it presents the undervalued and underrepresented posi-
tion of interpretivism in minute detail. It positions interpretivism vis-à-
vis the more current positions in philosophy of mind—something that has
not been done in this way since Dennett’s “Midterm Examination” (Dennett
1987, 339–350), which may be one of the reasons why interpretivism is usu-
ally treated as the “odd one out” in the philosophy of mind arena. Mölder’s
grounding of interpretivism in a clear metaphysics of pleonastic and nat-
ural properties, his connecting interpretivism with functionalism, practical
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realismor dispositional theories, and the (long awaited) description of an in-
terpretivist take on issues such as mental causation (where I was very glad to
see a variation on the program model being put to use) and self-knowledge
make for the most complete picture of the interpretivist position I have en-
countered so far.
Despite my general agreement, in this comment I shall concentrate on
where Mölder’s version of interpretivism diers from the version I would
prefer. I shall argue in what follows that Mölder’s position is not radical
enough to dispel what I take to be amisrepresentation of interpretivism as an
“as if ” theory (McCulloch 1990) or a theory that may just as well haven been
called ‘ctionalism’ (Ravenscro 2005). On this misconception, interpre-
tivism amounts to the idea that we pretend that humans and other systems
have minds for practical purposes, even though, for all we know, there may
not be such things as minds. is misconception of interpretivism hinges,
as I will explain below, on the idea that there is a meaning of ‘mental’ that
is not exhausted by our practices of mental state ascription. It is this “sur-
plus meaning” that gives sense to the idea that there may be an element of
pretense in practices of mental state ascription; we may be taken to refer
to something that does not exist. In the next section I shall describe why
Mölder is inclined to accept this “surplus meaning” of ‘mental’ as a means of
avoiding an overly radical and hence possibly indefensible reading of inter-
pretivism. I shall also argue, however, that by accepting this idea and hence
allowing—inadvertently—for an “as if ” reading of interpretivism, interpre-
tivism will precisely be perceived as being an indefensibly radical position.
In Section three, however, I will argue that, paradoxically, accepting the
more stringent form of interpretivism thatMölder labels “pure ascriptivism”
is the best way of avoiding an “as if ” reading of interpretivism. For on this
more radical position there is no meaning of ‘mental’ beyond our ascription
practices, which implies that there really is no sense to be made of an “as
if ” claim. I will also argue that pure ascriptivism is a much more defensible
position than Mölder makes it out to be. In the nal section of this com-
ment, I will argue further that pure ascriptivism allows for an easier and
more straightforward connection between interpretivism and mainstream
positions such as functionalism or dispositionalism.
2. Intermediate ascriptivism and the “as if” problem
Mölder describes his position as “intermediate ascriptivism.” is position
covers the middle ground between “revelationism” and “pure ascriptivism.”
According to revelationism, intentional patterns in the behaviour of, say,
humans exist independently of our intentional interpretations. Pure ascrip-
tivism, on the other hand, holds that the existence of mental states is ex-
20 Interpretivism and the Meaning of Mental State Ascriptions
hausted by the interpretability of behaviour in intentional terms. Interme-
diate ascriptivism is the “idea is that the ascription of mental states uncovers
an intentional pattern, which is not merely a matter of projection of inter-
preters” while it is nevertheless the case that “the interpretability is inelim-
inable from the full account of the pattern” (82). Mölder’smotivation for opt-
ing for intermediate rather than pure ascriptivism is the fact that he portrays
pure ascriptivism as a radical theory. e theory appears radical because it
seems tomakemy having amental state dependent on interpretation by oth-
ers.
But the price that is to be paid for this strategy of avoiding radicality is
to accept that the meaning of ‘mental’ is not exhausted by our practices of
ascription of mental states. Intermediate ascriptivism rejects, in Mölder’s
words, the idea that “one’s having mental states is exhausted by one’s being
accordingly interpreted or interpretable.” It rejects the notion that “[i]nter-
pretability is . . . a necessary and a sucient condition for having mental
states” and hence that ascriptivism “is a constitutive account of mental-state
possession.” (81)e upshot of this is that the meaning of ascribing amental
state to someone involves more than “merely” the appropriateness or fruit-
fulness of that ascription in the context of our interpretive practices. ere
is a surplus meaning of mental state ascriptions that is not captured by an
(imaginary) complete description of our ascription practices.
Mölder makes it clear that this surplus meaning is not to be understood
in terms of reference to internal states. Mental terms are not applicable, ac-
cording to him, “in virtue of the terms corresponding to internal mental en-
tities. Rather, they are applicable in virtue of us sharing a folk-psychological
conception that determines which sort of mental states are required in order
for us to make sense of given behaviour in a given environment.e ‘state’-
talk is a mere façon de parler . . . ” (149) Sense-making, rather than reference,
is central in the surplus meaning that exceeds our practices of mental state
ascription, then: “[t]he basic motive for mental state attribution is to make
sense of the subject’s behaviour and other mental states in mental terms.”
(176)
But if the ascription of mental states is not really ascription of inner
states, then in what sense can it be more than the mere appropriateness of
applied mental predicates, as is required by intermediate ascriptivism? As
I read Mölder, intermediate ascriptivism answers this question by allowing
for the idea that there is a commonmeaning of mental state ascriptions that
enables or drives our interpretive practices. By contrast, pure ascriptivism
would simply claim that the meaning of mental state ascriptions is some-
thing that emerges as a result of our practices of mental state ascription.
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But what would this common meaning consist in? What does it mean
to ascribemental states to people on an interpretivist account (if this mean-
ing is not to be cashed out in terms of postulating inner states)? is is not
just a question for Mölder. We can ask the same question to Daniel Den-
nett when he disconnects the meanings of intentional state ascriptions from
our factual intentionalistic language games by allowing e.g. thermostats to
have beliefs and desires as well (Dennett 1987, 22–34; see Slors 1996). Where
Dennett does not even seem to recognize the problem, though, Mölder is
clear about the fact that he considers this to be a problem that lies outside
the scope of his book: “I . . . think that there is a serious task of working out a
substantial theory of meaning. As concerns the ascription theory, however,
all we need to assume is that terms already have some kind of meaning, but
further details of the theory of meaning are not required.” (11) is is of
course not entirely true, for we need to make sure that the details of such
a theory do not contradict the central tenets of interpretivism. Mölder ac-
knowledges this carefully: “meaning should not be explicated in terms of
mental phenomena. For if the possession of such mental phenomena were
in turn explicated along interpretivist lines, the account would be circular.”
(152)us, the account that he envisages “would take those social roles that
govern the use of our terms as external to our minds: they are thus abstract
and objective patterns of usage.” (152)
But this indication of a theory of meaning that captures the meaning of
mental state ascriptions is ambiguous. If the meaning of mental state ascrip-
tions does indeed consist in abstract and objective patterns of usage, then
why reject, as the intermediate ascriptivist does, that “one’s having mental
states [i.e. one’s correctly being described as having mental states; M.S.]
is exhausted by one’s being accordingly interpreted or interpretable”? (81)
What I take Mölder to mean when he speaks of a theory of the meaning of
mental state talk in terms of its patterns of usage, then, is best captured as
follows: there is an understanding of the correct usage of mental state terms
that governs the actual use of such terms and that hence precedes our prac-
tices of mental state attribution. And it is this normative understanding of
the use of mental predicates that constitutes the surplus meaning of mental
state ascriptions that is not to be reduced to the factual practices of ascrip-
tion.
But even if this surplus meaning, this normative understanding of the
use of mental predicates, need not hinge on actual reference to hidden in-
ternal states that cause our behaviour, there is still the option that it may
hinge on imagined reference to inner states. Speaking of mental states is, in
Mölder’s words, a façon de parler, but the question is how much this façon
de parler contributes to a normative understanding of correct mental predi-
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cate application that would govern our ascriptive practices. It seems at least
possible to consider the surplus meaning to consist in the fact that the users
of psychological language take themselves to refer to inner states that cause
behaviour. at is, even if philosophers can explain this surplus meaning
without reference to inner states in terms of the rules of a psychological lan-
guage game, it may still be the case that the actual players of this language
game only understand the rules of mental state ascription if they take them-
selves to be referring to inner states. In viewof the fact thatmany people have
more or less Cartesian ideas about the mental and hence about the meaning
of mental state terms, this is a live option when we concede that the mean-
ing of mental state terms is not exhausted by our practices of mental state
ascription.
And that leaves the door open to an “as if ” reading of interpretivism.
Many philosophers take interpretivism to consist in the idea that we treat
each other as if we have mental states (i.e. that ascribing mental states in-
volves postulating inner states that cause behaviour) while in fact there are
no such things (which is indeed what Mölder argues; cf. McCulloch 1990,
Ravenscro 2005).is depiction of interpretivism, however, turns the the-
ory into a nigh-unacceptable option. It turns it into the idea that our day-
to-day talk about mental states is characterized by reference to non-existing
entities. Although this may prove to serve some purpose, it would neverthe-
less be the case that we merely pretend there to be mental states. If interpre-
tivism is to be a defensible option, then in my opinion we should take care
to rule out this reading. Paradoxically, as I will argue in the next section, it
is by opting for what appears to be the more extreme theory of pure ascrip-
tivism that we can do awaywith the idea of a surplusmeaning ofmental state
ascription that allows for the option of interpretivism as an “as if ” theory.
3. In defence of pure ascriptivism
Why does Mölder insist on intermediate ascriptivism? Why is pure ascrip-
tivism considered extreme (82)? Mölder is not really explicit on this. But
between the lines it can be read that what makes pure ascriptivism objec-
tionable is that it appears to make my being in mental state M dependent
upon someone else’s ascribing or being in a position to ascribe that state
to me. And that sounds absurd. Mental states are not Cambridge proper-
ties. Whether or not I am in mental state M should be dependent upon
interpreter-independent properties—however pleonastic or relational. It
should not be up to an interpreter.
But pure ascriptivism need not be committed to the idea that what men-
tal states I am in depends on the whims of some interpreter. AsMölder oen
acknowledges, the mental states a person is in need not depend on the ac-
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tual interpretations that observers are inclined to attribute, but rather on a
specic kind of interpretability. And it seems perfectly possible to cast in-
terpretability in objective, i.e. actual interpreter-independent ways. Den-
nett (1987, 1991), for instance, is clear about how this should be done. Given
behaviour is interpretable in terms of mental states M1. . .Mx , according to
him, when it is predictively or explanatorily useful to do so; that is when such
an ascription yields fruitful new predictions and ties in with other behaviour
in an explanatory way. Dened in this way, the usefulness of ascriptions is
an objective feature of them that is not up to the interpreter. Interpretabil-
ity of my behaviour in terms of mental states M1. . .Mx , then, may well be
regarded as a (relational) feature of my behaviour alone.
One crucial dierence between Dennett andMölder here is that instead
of a distinction between pleonastic and natural properties, Dennett employs
Reichenbach’s distinction between abstracta and illata. Illata are likeMölder’s
natural properties and both agree that mental states cannot be understood
in terms of them. Abstracta are pleonastic properties, but they are pleonastic
properties of a very specic kind. Abstracta serve an explanatory or predic-
tive purpose; their ascription allows us to access or disclose patterns in real-
ity (behavioural patterns in the case of mental states) that would otherwise
not be accessible or disclosed.
But here another dierence between the views of Mölder and Dennett
surfaces. In the description of mental state ascription Mölder gives in Sec-
tion 2 of Chapter 5, it becomes clear that mental state ascription, according
to him, is mainly retrospective. It is meant to make sense of behaviour, but
not necessarily to predict behaviour (whether explanation falls under sense-
making is unclear). Mölder: “not all ascriptions are made with the purpose
of predicting behaviour and not all ascriptions need generate predictions.”
(176)
But here we need to precise. e second part of this claim might seem
to be a repetition of the rst but it is not. We can accept that mental state as-
cription does not always serve the purpose of prediction while still sticking
to the claim that all ascriptions do generate predictions. In fact on all the-
ories of the meaning of mental state ascription that hinge on the idea that
the meaning of ascriptions hinges on the counterfactuals that it supports—
which I take to be most current theories—all mental state ascriptions should
involve predictions. When I ascribe the belief that Amsterdam is the capital
of theNetherlands to John, this implies that Imake certain predictions about
John’s behaviour in a range of hypothetical situations (he will utter the word
‘Amsterdam’ when asked what the capital of the Netherlands is, he will point
to Amsterdam when he is asked to point out the capital of the Netherlands
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on a map, etc.). Without making such predictions I would not be ascribing
the relevant belief state.
e point is that whatever use we make of mental state ascription must,
on a pragmatic, Dennettian view, be accounted for in terms of the counter-
factuals and concurrent predictions that are connected with the ascription
of mental states. is even goes for retrospective sense making: imagining
a relevant range of counterfactual situations and concurrent predictions can
actually perfectly well help to make sense of a piece of behaviour that is al-
ready performed. ‘He did it out of jealousy’ means ‘his actions sprang from
a state that would have produced behaviour B1. . .Bx under circumstances
C1. . .Cx .’ Two things are important to note: (1) Whether or not he was jeal-
ous really is an interpreter-independent fact—whether or not the relevant
counterfactuals implied in the practices of our mental state attribution are
true (which may well be something we will never know) is not up to the in-
terpreter. (2)e use that we make of mental state ascription does hinge on
prediction, even though this need not be overtly so.
Here it may be asked whether the set of counterfactuals associated with
the ascription of a certain mental state in a certain situation does not in fact
constitute a surplus meaning that exceeds our practices of mental state as-
cription. I think this would be the wrong conclusion. For the set of coun-
terfactuals that are implied by the application of a certain mental state term
is xed by the usage of that term in our actual practices. Nothing would ex-
plain further counterfactuals that are not associated with our use of mental
state terms, nor is there any explanatory purpose that would be served by
invoking such extra counterfactuals.
Pure ascriptivism, then, amounts to the idea that the meaning of mental
state ascriptions hinges on the counterfactuals associated with these ascrip-
tions and the practices of mental state ascription determine the full range
of counterfactuals associated with a given mental state term. On this view,
then, which is reminiscent of the Rylean strands in Dennett’s Intentional
Stance theory but which may just as well be compared to Lynne Baker’s
practical realism, there is no surplus meaning of mental state ascriptions
over and above our practices of mental state attribution. And without such
surplus meaning, there is simply no sense to be made of the notion of pre-
tending to ascribe mental states; the idea of “as if ” ascription is empty. e
point here is akin to Ryle’s (1949, Chapter 1) criticism of the idea that intel-
ligent behaviour is behaviour that is caused by inner mental states: in order
to be in a position to invoke inner causes for intelligent behaviour, we need
to be able to identify intelligent behaviour as such and distinguish it from,
say, sneezes and hiccups. But once we are in that position, invoking inner
causes is completely redundant, non explanatory and hence meaningless as
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a means of distinguishing intelligent from other behaviour, for we already
have that distinction. e point here is identical: there is no use for, and
hence meaning to be given to “as if ” ascription. Pure ascriptivism does not
allow for an “as if ” interpretation.
Paradoxically, then, given that an “as if ” interpretation depicts interpre-
tivism as a radical theory, a stricter pure ascriptivism can be defended as a
less radical option than the less strict intermediate version.
4. Pure ascriptivism and the metaphysics of mental explanation
One asset of Mölder’s ascriptivism is that it does not position itself as a view
that completely rules out other positions in the philosophy of mind, such
as functionalism, dispositionalism or practical realism. I very much think
that this is the right way to go. e version of pure asriptivism described in
the previous section also allows for the compatibility of interpretivism and
other positions in the philosophy of mind. In this semi-nal section I want
to compare Mölder’s views on this compatibility with the views implied by
pure ascriptivism (in the form outlined above). I will argue in favour of pure
ascriptivism.
As a means of introducing his ascription theory, Mölder rst discusses
traditional views on the mind-body relation (or the mind-brain relation)
such as functionalism, dispositional accounts and practical realism. He ar-
gues that these views “are compatible with the interpretivist approach in the
sense that it is possible to plug an interpretivist component in these views
. . . . [O]ne can argue . . . that instantiating a functional role, having an appro-
priate disposition and the truth of relevant counterfactuals are a matter of
interpretation.” (154)
Given what is said about the interpreter-independent status of inten-
tional interpretability of behaviour in the previous section, it should be clear
that this option is not the one I would favour. Inmy view, the “relevant coun-
terfactuals” are what we ascribe when we ascribe mental states and the in-
terpretability in intentional terms of behaviour consists in the fact that high-
lighting those counterfactuals serves practical purposes, such as predicting
further behaviour.e idea that these counterfactuals themselves would be
dependent upon interpretation seems to point clearly to the idea that the
meaning of mental state ascription is not exhausted by exploiting existing
counterfactuals.is is intermediate interpretivism, not pure ascriptivism.
Pure ascriptivists can agree with Mölder, however, that ascriptivism is
not incompatible per se with functionalism, dispositionalism or a counter-
factual approach to the nature of mental states and mental state ascription.
Rather than inserting an element of interpretation in functionalism, dispo-
sitionalism and counterfactual approaches, however, I would suggest assim-
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ilation in the case of dispositionalism and counterfactual approaches on the
one hand and a division of theoretical labour in the case of functionalism.
e version of pure ascriptivism outlined and defended above incorporates
dispositionalism and counterfactual approaches. ere are dierences in
emphasis but the metaphysical commitments of these theories to overlap.
is is not the case with functionalism. Functionalism makes claims about
the nature of mental states (they are causal role states) and hence makes cer-
tain demands on the implementation bases of our mental states. Interpre-
tivism does not necessarily share these metaphysical commitments. How-
ever, if functionalism turns out to be true, the instantiation of causal role
states would be what explains the fruitfulness of intentional interpretations
of behaviour. It would explain why certain counterfactuals hold and why
people have the behavioural dispositions they have.
So pure ascriptivism is compatible with functionalism. But it is not com-
mitted to it. It is simply committed to whatever explains the truth of the sets
of counterfactuals that we postulate in ascribing mental states to each other.
is may be a functionalist explanation, but it might just as well be a non-
mental neural explanation. As long as there is something that explains why
the counterfactuals hold. Pure ascriptivism ismerely committed to the claim
that when it is true that person P is in mental stateM, a specic set of coun-
terfactuals holds, but it can accept any reasonable explanation of the fact that
these counterfactuals hold.
is division of labour view on the compatibility of interpretivism and
functionalism seems tome tomore transparent than allowing for an element
of interpretation in assigning causal roles. e interesting thing is that it
seems to t extremely well with Mölder’s own ideas on mental causation
from an interpretivist point of view. Here’s a very telling quote (230-231)
Giving causal explanations inmental termsneednot imply token iden-
tity or other kinds of reductionism. But it is still the case that when
an action occurs, some physical process must take place. Its explana-
tion in folk-psychological terms does not point out the relata of this
process, but it does not follow that there are no ecacious entities
involved. Similarly, when we make a successful prediction of an ac-
tion, which is conrmed by the further course of events, there must
again be something causally ecacious occurring or being instanti-
ated. . . .e reason why it was hard to explain how mental entities
can be causes is that this task was previously taken to consist in ex-
plaining how mental entities can have causal ecacy, which indeed
they cannot have.
I could not agree more (see Slors 2007).
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5. Concluding remark
is brings me to a nal remark that needs to be made. It is quite possible
that I have exaggerated the dierences between Mölder’s views and my own
for the sake of argument. If I have, however, I think the distinction between
pure and intermediate ascriptivism is the source of confusion—it had better
been given up.
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